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Abstract 
 
While there is potential for conflict in Central 
Asia over water resources, due to the lack of full 
implementation of agreed arrangements, there is 
still very little chance of armed confrontation 
between countries in the region. In spite of 
occasional tensions, countries in the region 
cooperate with each other through international 
mediation and resolve their disagreements. 
However, after two decades of international 
efforts to revitalize the Aral Sea and implement 
changes to stabilize the ecological situation in the 
area, the problems of drying this important sea as 
a major drainage in the Central Asian region, and 
it does not seem that a proper and applicable 
solution in the near future in order to end the 
crisis. The five Central Asian leaders agree on the 
close proximity of the Aral Sea's drying due to 
overuse and water losses that enter the sea 
through the two main rivers of “Amu Darya” and 
“Syr Darya”. These leaders are also aware of the 
catastrophic consequences of the living and 
health conditions of about 40 million inhabitants 
of the coastal area of the Sea. But the political and 
personal disputes between these leaders will put 
an end to these negotiations. Also, given that Iran 
and Afghanistan are common with Central Asian 
countries in the Aral Sea basin, these countries 
are also required to be present in the water talks. 
In order to reply to the main question of how the 
level of water diplomacy can be promoted in the 
Aral basin, the authors believe that  “Participation 
of all stakeholders in water talks”, “More active 
role by international organizations”, “Review  of 
inappropriate water plans” and  “Use of new 
water resources” in the Aral Sea basin, can settle 
  Аннотация 
 
Хотя в Центральной Азии существует 
вероятность конфликта по поводу водных 
ресурсов, из-за отсутствия полного 
осуществления согласованных 
договоренностей вероятность вооруженной 
конфронтации между странами региона по-
прежнему весьма мала. Несмотря на 
эпизодическую напряженность, страны 
региона сотрудничают друг с другом 
посредством международного 
посредничества и урегулирования своих 
разногласий. Однако после двух десятилетий 
международных усилий по оживлению 
Аральского моря и осуществлению 
изменений в целях стабилизации 
экологической ситуации в этом районе, 
Проблемы высыхания этого важного моря 
как крупного дренажа в центральноазиатском 
регионе, И, как представляется, в ближайшем 
будущем не будет найдено надлежащего и 
применимого решения для того, чтобы 
положить конец кризису. Пять лидеров 
страны Центральной Азии сходятся во 
мнении о непосредственной близости 
высыхания Аральского моря из-за 
перерасхода и потерь воды, которые 
попадают в море через две основные реки 
"Аму-Дарья" и "Сыр-Дарья". Эти лидеры 
также осознают катастрофические 
последствия условий жизни и здоровья около 
40 миллионов жителей прибрежной зоны 
Баренцева моря. Но политические и личные 
споры между этими лидерами положат конец 
этим переговорам. Также, учитывая, что Иран 
и Афганистан являются общими со странами 
Центральной Азии в бассейне Аральского 
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water disputes through dialogue in the framework 
of water diplomacy. 
 
Key Words: Afghanistan. Aral Sea Basin, Central 
Asian Countries, Iran, Water Resources; Water 
Diplomacy. 
моря, эти страны также обязаны 
присутствовать на водных переговорах. Для 
того чтобы ответить на главный вопрос о том, 
как можно повысить уровень водной 
дипломатии в Аральском бассейне, Авторы 
считают, что "Участие всех 
заинтересованных сторон в переговорах по 
водным ресурсам", "Более активная роль 
международных организаций", "Обзор 
ненадлежащих водных планов" и 
"Использование новых водных ресурсов" в 
бассейне Аральского моря, Может 
урегулировать водные споры посредством 
диалога в рамках водной дипломатии. 
 
Ключевые слова: Афганистан. Бассейне 
Аральского Моря, Страны Центральной 
Азии, Иран, Водные Ресурсы; Водной 
Дипломатии. 
Resumen 
 
Si bien existe el potencial del conflicto en Asia Central por los recursos hídricos, debido a falta de 
implementación completa de los acuerdos acordados, todavía hay muy pocas posibilidades de 
confrontación armada entre los países de esa región. A pesar de las tensiones ocasionales, los países de la 
región cooperan entre sí a través de la mediación internacional y resuelven sus desacuerdos. Sin embargo, 
después de dos décadas de esfuerzos internacionales para revitalizar la Mar de Aral e implementar cambios 
para estabilizar la situación ecológica en el área, los problemas de secar este importante mar como un 
drenaje importante en la región de Asia Central, no parecen ser un adecuado y solución aplicable en el 
futuro cercano para poner fin a la crisis. Los cinco líderes de Asia Central coinciden en la proximidad de la 
desecación del mar de Aral debido al utilizo excesivo y las pérdidas del agua que ingresaran al mar a través 
de los dos ríos principales "Amu Darya" y "Syr Darya". Estos líderes también son conscientes de las 
consecuencias catastróficas de las condiciones de vida y salud de unos 40 millones de habitantes de la zona 
costera del mar. Pero las disputas políticas y personales entre estos líderes pondrán fin a estas 
negociaciones. Además, dado que Irán y Afganistán son comunes en la cuenca del mar de Aral con los 
países de Asia Central, estos países también deben estar presentes en las conversaciones sobre el agua. Para 
responder a la pregunta principal de cómo se puede promover el nivel de diplomacia del agua en la cuenca 
del Aral, los autores creen que "Participación de todas las partes interesadas en las conversaciones sobre el 
agua", "Papel más activo por parte de organizaciones internacionales", "Revisión de inapropiada los planes 
de agua” y “Uso de nuevos recursos hídricos” en la cuenca del mar de Aral pueden resolver las disputas 
sobre el agua mediante el diálogo en el marco de la diplomacia del agua. 
 
Palabras clave: Afganistán. Cuenca del Mar de Aral, Países de Asia Central, Irán, Recursos Hídricos; 
Diplomacia del Agua. 
 
 
Introduction 
The Aral Sea basin as a major trans-boundary basin includes parts of 7 Islamic countries in the Asian region 
including the Islamic Republic of Iran, Afghanistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and 
Turkmenistan (Table. 1). Common countries in the basin are divided into two groups: the upstream 
countries include Afghanistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, where the main waters of the basin originate 
from these countries, and the lower countries include Iran, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, 
which the common waters of the Aral basin lead to these countries (Figure. 1). In general, the upstream 
countries of the Aral basin economically are not in a good position, and in contrast, the downstream 
countries of the basin have better economies than the upstream ones. 
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Table. 1. Common countries in the Aral Sea basin and the area of them that located in the basin (Micklin, 
2000: 4). 
 
Row Country name 
Total area of 
the country 
)2(km 
Area of the 
country in the 
)2basin (km 
Percentage of 
total area of 
the country 
Percentage of 
total area of 
the basin 
* Whole basin 6,299,123 1,765,958 28 100 
1 Uzbekistan 447,232 438,287 98 25 
2 Turkmenistan 488,680 378,000 77 21 
3 Kazakhstan 2,728,185 365,400 13 21 
4 Afghanistan 653,004 262,800 40 15 
5 Kyrgyzstan 198,737 144,000 72 8 
6 Tajikistan 143,271 143,271 100 8 
7 Iran 1,640,015 34,200 2 2 
 
 
 
 
Figure. 1. Geographic location of the Aral Sea basin (World Lake Databace). 
 
The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 caused problems in the Aral basin. The hardest problems that the 
region faced after independence was mainly a tight link between regional water management systems. 
These links ignored the new political boundaries (Klötzli, 1997). 
 
Today, the Central Asian region faces some environmental problems, the most important of which is the 
drying crisis of the “Aral Sea”. The former Soviet Union's efforts to increase cotton production in the 
Central Asian region (mostly in the Aral Sea basin) nowadays have hit the sea (the lowest point of the 
basin) with a drying crisis (Wegerich, 2003: 252-254 ) “Fergana valley” as one of the fertile sections of the 
Aral Basin, affects the economies of the region to its agricultural production (Rashid, 1994: 7). But this 
valley and the rest of the fertile regions of the region are divided between the republics. For example, in the 
Soviet period in the Syr Darya basin (including the Fergana valley), there were 6 irrigation zones, some of 
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which were transboundary: “Upper Naryn”, “Chakir” (Chirchik-Akhangaran-Keles), “Midstream”, “Arys-
Turkestan” (Artur) and “Downstream” (Wegerich, Van Rooijen & Soliev, 2015: 4663). 
 
Non-rainfed agriculture accounts for 50 percent of GDP in the Aral Sea basin. The agricultural sector in 
this region has a major priority in economic development programs and destroys other sectors of the 
economy (UNEP, 2005: 30). This trend continues even after the independence of the countries of the region; 
as long as in independent Turkmenistan, the non-rainfed land has increased sharply (Vajpeyi, 2012: 179). 
In general, after 1991, the area of the non-rainfed lands of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan gradually dropped, 
in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan and was almost stable and in Turkmenistan has grown (Madramootoo & 
Dukhovny, 2011: 7). 
 
Improvement in irrigation productivity in the upstream regions of the common countries in the Aral Sea 
basin does not necessarily increase water flow to the downstream areas, and instead, the stored water is 
directed in the newly irrigated areas in the same countries (McKinney, 2004: 215). The fear of losing the 
current status among Central Asian countries is evident, and this has prevented farmers from diversifying 
their cultivating. This belief is seen among central state authorities, elites and ordinary people, if farmers 
reduce cotton production, this will cause financial losses and economic systems will be weakened (Peachey, 
2004: 9). 
 
Kazakhstan is rich in minerals, and once it has 99 elements of 110 discovered elements in the Periodic 
Table (Anjaiah, 2016). After the independence of the country in 1991, exports of crude oil, gas, and metallic 
materials account for a large part of its GDP, and Kazakhstan has withdrawn its dependence on agricultural 
production and exports (Luong & Weinthal, 2001: 381). 
 
Although Kyrgyzstan is a mountainous country and does not have significant cultivated lands, one third of 
Kyrgyzstan's GDP is supplied through agriculture, and 40 percent of its labor force is engaged in agriculture 
(Akramov & Omuraliev, 2009: 1). But due to the inappropriateness of the irrigation and drainage situation, 
about 1,500 square kilometers of Kyrgyzstan's agricultural land are on the verge of salinity and about 1,400 
square kilometers are on the verge of drying (totaling about 2,900 square kilometers) (Orozumbekov et al. 
2009: 138). Agricultural production accounts for 52.1 percent, and livestock production accounts for 46.1 
percent of gross agricultural production in Kyrgyzstan (Wendelberger & Kodirov, 2012: 9). 
 
“Water resources management” includes various activities including monitoring, modeling, exploration, 
evaluation, designing criteria and strategies, policy implementation, operations, maintenance, 
measurement, and supporting activities such as organizational reform (Savenije & Hoekstra, 2009: 2). 
Gradually, water management was accompanied by security concerns, a phenomenon called “water 
resources management security” (Phillips, Daoudy & McCaffrey, 2006: 20). The meaning of this naming 
is that the issue of water is linked to “national security concerns”. There is something as an international 
security issue that is a much more important topic than other issues and is a top priority as an existential 
threat (Buzan, Wver & De Wilde, 1998: 24-27). 
 
In general, “water security” is a complete set of conditions, processes and measures to ensure water balance 
and to ensure that there are no hazards/threats to natural and human communities within all parts of the 
basin. “Water policy” in the field of water security should provide a system of measures to maintain the 
balance between the “biosphere”, human interventions and other external factors affecting the water cycle 
in the basin (Sokolov: 5). Imports of “virtual water” can be ensure water security. When the term virtual 
water is used, it refers to the quantity of hidden water in the food, even if a large portion of this water is not 
seen and is virtual. Some researchers have tried to count the amount of water hidden in any food, and this 
hidden water contains the total amount of water used in the food cycle (UNESCO, 2014: 2). 
 
Due to the constant flow of water from a region or country to an other region or country, and due to the 
political borders of different countries in the path of a number of these water flows, some disagreements 
and consequently, negotiations and cooperation on the management of these common resources in the frame 
of foreign policy the world countries have emerged, that this part of the foreign policy of countries is known 
as “water diplomacy”. In this paper, we will pay to the background and status of water diplomacy in the 
Aral Sea basin. 
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Considering that most researches in this context, just paid to water relations and water diplomacy between 
the Central Asian countries, this research is an innovation by account the whole of the common countries 
in the Aral basin and adding the water relations of Afghanistan and Iran in the basin.  
 
Methodology 
 
The study area is the Aral Sea basin, which is common between 7 countries: Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, 
Kazakhstan, Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Iran. 
 
Data for total area of each common countries in the Aral Sea basin and area of them located in the basin by 
these parts percentages were obtained from the book: “Managing water in Central Asia”. 
 
Information on institutions established in the field of water diplomacy in the Aral Sea basin has been 
extracted from various sources, including the official websites of these institutions. 
 
The history of water diplomacy in the Aral Sea basin from the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 to 2008 
has been largely extracted from the book: “Aral Sea Encyclopedia”; although other sources have been used 
to some extent. But for water diplomacy events in the basin after the date of publishing the book in 2008, 
other sources have been used. 
 
Facts and findings 
 
In the Central Asian region, the disproportionate distribution of water due to the allocation of more water 
to the republics defined in the Soviet period as agricultural purpose, the co-existence of some water 
resources in very fertile boundary regions such as Fergana valley, the lack of proper management of water 
resources in the Soviet period, and failure of international law on the optimal allocation of water resources, 
the growing population of the region and the development of agriculture in the region republics for self-
sufficiency in food production are among the problems that put water security at serious risk. 
 
The flow of water in the Aral Sea basin, which affects the downstream countries (Iran, Uzbekistan, 
Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan) to the upstream countries (Afghanistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan) in terms 
of security of water, and any changes in this flow in the upper parts, threatens the life of the parts or whole 
of the lower lands; the two countries of Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, while are in downstream and 
dependent on the water resources of the upstream countries, use most of the Aral basin waters (mostly 
agricultural), and as a result, the economy of these countries is also deeply dependent on the upstream 
countries entrance water. 
 
Since 1991, the upstream countries of the Aral basin have begun to exploit and control most of the common 
water resources originating from these countries, and they are faced with the negative reaction of the 
downstream countries that are heavily dependent on these waters. In the Aral Sea basin, Uzbekistan, 
Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan, which supplied in the Soviet period, oil and gas for the two upstream 
countries of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan at very low cost, in response to the construction of large dams in 
the upstream, increased their export energy costs to the upstream countries and sometimes stopped their 
exports.  
 
Institutions established in the field of water diplomacy in the Aral basin 
 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, institutions were set up to change the irrigation system and water 
resources management in the Central Asian region to find a solution to solve the water crisis in this region. 
“Interstate Council for the problems of the Aral Sea Basin” (ICAB), “Interstate Commission for Water 
Coordination” (ICWC), “Interstate Commission on Sustainable Development” (ICSD), “International Fund 
to Save the Aral Sea” (IFAS) and “Central Asia Water Sector Coordination Initiative” (CAWSCI), are 
among these institutions.  
 
A. ICAB 
 
The “Interstate Council for the problems of the Aral Sea Basin” (ICAB) was established in 1993 along with 
its affiliated “Executive Committee”, and the “Interstate Commission for Water Coordination” (ICWC) 
was integrated into the council's structure. 
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The members of the Aral council, from all five Central Asian republics, met every six months and decided 
on the development plans provided by the executive committee of the council. 
 
In 1994, the “Interstate Commission on Social and Economic Development, Scientific, Technical, and 
Ecological Cooperation” (ICSDSTEC), later renamed the “Interstate Commission for Sustainable 
Development” (ICSD), as an affiliated institution of the ICAB, it was formed. 
 
Finally, the ICAB, together with its two subsidiary bodies, ICWC and ICSD, was merged into the IFAS in 
1997.  
 
B. IFAS 
 
The “International Fund to Save the Aral Sea” (IFAS) was established in 1993. The goal of this international 
body is to address the problems of the Aral Sea and provide social, economic and other services to the 
people living in the region (Mosello, 2008: 161). 
 
At the time of the formation of the Aral fund, all Central Asian countries pledged to contribute a percentage 
of their government's annual revenues to the fund each year, and the revenues of the institution are now 
through contributions from member states and donations. Of course, later, as it turned out, none of the 
member states paid their full financial obligations, this percentage was down 0.3 percent of the 
government's revenues for the richer downstream countries, and 0.1 of the government's revenues for the 
poorer upstream countries. 
 
The head of IFAS is in circulation among the five member states. Therefore, the fund's “executive 
committee” has been deployed in different capitals of the region since the first year of its foundation: 
Almaty, Kazakhstan (1997-1993), Tashkent, Uzbekistan (1997-1999), Ashgabat, Turkmenistan (1999-
2002), Dushanbe, Tajikistan (2003-2009) and again Almaty (after 2009) were the places where the Aral 
fund executive committee was there. Of course, the deployment site of the committee was supposed to be 
transferred to Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan from 2005, which did not happen due to Kyrgyzstan's inflammation in 
that year, and the executive committee still remained in place in Dushanbe until 2009 (Water Unite, 2015). 
Strategy and operational program of the IFAS (Ibatullin, 2010: 6): 
 
1. Continue cooperation with the aim of improving ecological and socioeconomic status in the Aral 
Sea basin. 
 
2. Develop mutually acceptable mechanisms for the integrated water resources management and 
environmental protection in Central Asia, taking into account the interests of all countries in the 
region. 
 
As previously mentioned, ICWC and ICSD were merged into the new structure of the IFAS in 1997 (Figure. 
2).
 
 
 
Figure. 2. Overall structure of the IFAS. 
 
 
IFAS
Executive Committee of 
IFAS
ICSD ICWC
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B1.  ICWC 
 
The “Interstate Commission for Water Coordination” (ICWC) was the first institution created after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union on Central Asian waters. The commission was established in 1992 to operate 
the agreement signed between the countries of the Central Asian region on water resources in that year.  
 
The ICWC, a joint committee of water ministers from five Central Asian countries, has been established to 
facilitate the implementation of quotas and to control the economic organization in the Amu Darya and Syr 
Darya basins. 
 
The members of the ICWC, the “Basin Water Associations” (BWA) (the Syr Darya association center in 
Tashkent and the Amu Darya association center in Urgench, Uzbekistan), monitor the implementation of 
quotas, and can increase or decrease these quotas by up to 15 percent. In fact, the commission is merely 
capable of dividing the water quota of the countries of the region and can not manage the agricultural and 
energy sectors that make up most of the water in the basin. The ICWC also manages a “Scientific 
Information Centre”, trains water authorities, and manages a comprehensive database that can be assessed 
by member states. (UNECE, 2009: 47). 
 
The main issues addressed at the ICWC are: (ICWC, 2004): 
 
1. To determine the economic unit of the water economy and to establish its main axes based on the 
interests of the people and different parts of the country, 
 
2. Logical use of water resources and their protection,  
 
3. Plans to increase water supply for rivers and related measures, 
 
4. Determine the limitation of annual water consumption from its main resources for each country 
and mode of exploitation of large reservoirs, 
 
5. Management and adjustment of water allocation in real conditions of access to water and in terms 
of saving. 
 
The main tasks and functions of the ICWC and its implementing structures include the following (ICWC, 
2004): 
 
1. River basin management, 
 
2. Non-conflict allocation of water, 
 
3. Organize negotiations on trans-boundary water flows, 
 
4. Interaction with hydro-meteorological services to predict water flows and calculations in this 
context, 
 
5. Introducing automation to supreme structures, 
 
6. Regular work on the progress of the ICWC and its structures, 
 
7. Preparation of interstate agreements, 
 
8. Scientific  
 
9. Research, Training. 
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B2. ICSD 
 
The “Interstate Commission on Social and Economic Development, Scientific, Technical, and Ecological 
Cooperation” (ICSDSTEC), later renamed the “Interstate Commission for Sustainable Development” 
(ICSD), it was formed in 1994 as one of the ICAB affiliated institutions. 
 
The commission's main objective is to coordinate and oversee cooperation on environmental protection and 
sustainable development in Central Asia. Members of the ICSD meet twice a year, and the commission's 
head is circulating among member states. Also affiliated “Scientific Information Center” is also located in 
Ashgabat.  
 
C. CAWSCI 
 
The “Central Asia Water Sector Coordination Initiative” (CAWSCI) intends to attract support from global 
water organizations to the region and the water crisis. The initiative was supposed to act as an online 
database of all water projects in the Central Asian region. However, it did not succeed in attracting other 
agencies to share information and gradually decreased its budget (Lipiäinen & Smith, 2013: 11). 
 
The purpose of the CAWSCI is to chart the activities of various international and regional actors in the 
Central Asian waters and to support the exchange of information, thus facilitating coordination between 
partners, plans and processes by identifying and continuously describing trends, initiatives, plans, and the 
rest (WaterWiki.net, 2010).  
 
Water diplomacy of Iran in the Aral basin 
 
The Islamic Republic of Iran because of very small part of its territory is located in Aral Sea basin (only 
the Karakum basin in the northeast of the country as the sub-basin of the Hari basin), and that this small 
part is considered downstream of the basin, and the input and output of water to this compared to the entire 
basin, can be ignored, so it has not participated in regional initiatives for water diplomacy in the Aral basin 
organized by post-Soviet countries. The “Hari River” (Tejen) is the main Iranian common river in the Aral 
basin, and the country on this river is common with Afghanistan and Turkmenistan (formerly: the Soviet 
Union). Iran has agreed with the Soviet Union and later Turkmenistan on Hari river, but the river is still the 
main source of water disputes with Afghanistan. 
 
The most important event in the context of water diplomacy between Iran and the Soviet Union was the 
friendship treaty between the two countries, which was signed on February 26, 1921. The treaty for the first 
time was to determine the fair value of the two countries water from Hari, and 30 percent of the total water 
to Iran and 70 percent to the Soviet Union. After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the independence of 
Turkmenistan, Turkmen former president “Saparmurat Niyazov” traveled to Tehran on October 16, 1991, 
signing a memorandum of cooperation with Iran on the construction of a dam on Tejen. Friendship dam 
caused half of Tejen's water to enter Iran, while a large part of the river's water entered Turkmenistan before 
the dam was constructed, and the share of the Soviet side was 70 percent according to the Iran-Soviet 
friendship treaty. 
 
The transfer of water from the Amu Darya and Tajikistan to Iran is one of the plans put forward by some 
experts to save the northeastern and eastern parts of Iran from the depression crisis. This plan will only be 
possible if it does not reduce the current volume of Amu Darya's water; that is, it should either use 
Turkmenistan's 22 billion cubic meters of Amu Darya (because a large amount of that surplus), or that it 
should be implemented after water transfers between basins like the transfer of water from the Siberian 
rivers to Central Asia, which was raised during the Soviet period, after the increase in the current volume 
of Amu Darya's water, can negotiate about transfer part of its water to Iran .In this case, Iran in addition to 
the countries of the Central Asian region, must negotiate with Russia on water diplomacy. Because 
Tajikistan is dissatisfied with the flow of its waters to downstream countries, this low-income country will 
definitely support water exports to Iran. But this will be countered by the negative reaction of other 
countries in the region. 
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Water diplomacy of Afghanistan in the Aral basin 
 
Due to the devastating civil wars in recent decades, Afghanistan has failed to take steps to address issues 
such as environmental protection and water resource management, and to engage constructively with 
neighboring countries. Afghanistan's neighbors, also due to the fact that the Kabul-based government does 
not dominate all areas of the country, has invited less than Afghanistan as a regional actor in its meetings, 
which has sometimes resulted in signing agreements, due to ongoing civil wars, and regional talks are more 
about Afghanistan than with the country. In the context of water diplomacy, there are conflicts between 
Afghanistan and its neighbors on water issues, due to the absence of Afghanistan in these talks and the 
failure to reach an agreement that is acceptable to the country. 
 
Under the agreement signed between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union in 1949, the Afghan side was 
allowed to consumed 9 billion cubic meters of water annually from the Amu Darya (Mosello, 2008: 157). 
But in 1985, it consumed only 1.5 billion cubic meters of Amu Darya water per year, and is now likely to 
seek to use more than just its own. With the construction of the “Iran–Turkmenistan Friendship Dam”, one 
of its goals being to provide drinking water to the city of Mashhad as the second largest city in Iran, this 
region of Iran was somehow influenced by Kabul's policies and decisions. The plans that Afghanistan 
makes after the establishment of relative political stability to exploit Hari river, such as the construction of 
the “Afghan-India Friendship Dam” (Salma), confirms this.  
 
Water diplomacy between post-Soviet countries in the Aral basin 
 
Some of the measures that have been taken between 1991 and 2018 to resolve disputes in the Aral Sea basin 
between post-Soviet countries of Central Asia in the framework of water talks and water diplomacy (Zonn 
et al. 2009: 269, 271-278 and 281): 
 
1. In 1991, the protocol on the preparation of an intergovernmental agreement on Aral Issues was 
signed at the first meeting of the leaders of the “Commonwealth of Independent States” (CIS) in 
Minsk, the capital of Belarus. 
 
2. On October 12, 1991, at the meeting of the ministers of “Land Improvement and Water 
Management” of the Central Asian republics in Tashkent, “Application on Sharing Water 
Resources of the Aral Sea basin” was accepted. The application emphasized the commitment to 
water quotas in the Soviet era. The 1991 Declaration, though not signed by the ministers and not 
the presidents. But was a prerequisite for the signing of the ”Almaty Agreement” in 1992 by the 
high ranking officials of the region. 
 
3. On February 18, 1992, the Central Asian republics “Water-Economic Organizations” was held in 
Almaty, during which an agreement was signed between the five republics of the region “In the 
Sphere of Joint Management of Use and Protection of Water resources of Interstate Sources”, 
which became known as the Almaty Agreement. According to the agreement, each of the Central 
Asian countries was required to prevent any action in their homeland that would disregard or 
endanger the interests of other countries. 
 
Following the Almaty Agreement, in Tashkent, the leaders of the water-economic organizations of the 
Central Asian republics signed the "Interstate Commission for Water Coordination" and approved the 
Almaty Agreement. 
 
The Almaty Agreement, signed in the first year after the collapse between the region countries, further 
emphasizes the preservation of water resources management way in the Soviet era. Given the definition of 
agricultural performance for the downstream countries of the Aral basin in the Soviet era, the agreement 
also emphasizes the allocation of much more water to downstream countries than the upstream countries 
(as the source of these resources). But this this issue gradual and by evident its results, were challenged by 
the upstream countries. 
 
4. On March 26, 1993, in Kyzylorda, Kazakhstan, the presidents of all the countries of the Central 
Asian region signed “Agreement on Joint Actions under the Decision of the Problem of the Aral 
Sea and Priaral’e for Ecological Improvement and Maintenance of Social and Economic 
Development of the Aral Region”. They made this agreement for sanitation of sewage and 
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development of the region, and included general measures such as “rational use of limited water 
resources to ensure socio-economic development in the Aral region”, “the revitalization of the 
complex ecosystem of the Amu Darya and Syr Darya delta” and “the development of water quality 
and health status of residents of the region”. 
 
5. In 1993, the state heads of Central Asia provided the initiative to create IFAS in Almaty. 
Kazakhstan's former president “Nursultan Nazarbayev” was elected as chairman of the fund. 
 
6. In 1993, the then Uzbekistan's former president “Islam Karimov” welcomed the creation of a 
special commission by the United Nations and with agreement by the countries of the region on 
the issue of Aral Sea at the United Nations General Assembly in New York, United States. 
 
7. In 1993, with the decision of the ICWC, the "Scientific Information Center" attached to the ICWC 
was created in Tashkent, and the permanent secretariat of the commission was set up in Khujand, 
Tajikistan. Between 1996 and 1997, the “Main Provisions of the Regional Water Strategy of the 
Aral Sea Basin” were developed by the center and presented to the World Bank. 
 
8. In 1993, the ICAB, together with its executive committee, was formed, and the ICWC was 
integrated into the structure of this council. 
 
9. In 1994, in Nukus, Uzbekistan, the leaders of the five Central Asian countries, with the 
participation of the Russian Federation, signed “The Program of Concrete Actions in the Aral Sea 
Basin” composed of eight main axes. 
 
10. In 1994, the ICSDSTEC, later renamed the ICSD, as one of the affiliated organs to the ICAB was 
formed. 
 
11. In 1994, the resolution of the leaders of the Central Asian republics entitled “Concept on 
Improvement of Socioeconomic and Environmental Conditions in the Circum-Aral Area” was 
approved. 
 
12. On September 20, 1995, in Nukus, Uzbekistan, the Central Asian presidents signed the “Nukus 
Declaration” and expressed their willingness to trust and grant any assistance to the IFAS and its 
affiliated organizations. 
 
13. In 1996, in Bishkek, the presidents of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan negotiated about 
the issues of the use of hydro-electric resources. 
 
14. In 1997, the “Almaty Declaration” was signed at the meeting of state heads of Central Asia on 
issues in the Aral Sea basin. 
 
15. On February 28, 1997, in Almaty, at the same time as the signing of an agreement between the 
presidents of Central Asian countries on the rebuilding of existing interstate organizations, the 
IFAS was transformed and Uzbekistan's former president Islam Karimov, selected as the new head 
of the fund. 
 
The permanent executive board and management structure of the executive committee of IFAS was 
established in Tashkent, and its branches were established in all Central Asian countries. 
At the same time, the ICAB and its functions merged at the IFAS. 
 
16. On March 17, 1998, between the four common republics in the Syr Darya basin (Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan), an agreement was reached on the use of water and energy 
resources in the basin of the river as the Aral Sea sub basin in the form of “previously established 
institutions” signed (UNECE, 2009: 5). This agreement was reached on how to operate the Kyrgyz 
“Toktogul” hydroelectric dam and power plant, so that Kyrgyzstan's surplus water flow is 
distributed equitably between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan and in return, energy, other services or 
money will be delivered to Kyrgyzstan. 
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Of course, Bishkek, after signing the 1998 agreement, declared it considered water as a commercial 
commodity, and if Uzbekistan does not pay for it, it will sell its water to Beijing. 
 
17. On April 9, 1999, a summit of Central Asian countries was convened in Ashgabat, during which 
Turkmenistan's former president Saparmurat Niyazov elected as the head of IFAS. During this 
meeting, the “Declaration on the issues of the Aral Sea Basin” was approved by the heads of 
Central Asian countries. 
 
18. In 2000, Turkmenistan began building a “Golden Age Lake” in the “Karakum Desert” to collect 
wastewater from parts of Turkmenistan and the “Khwarazm Region” of Uzbekistan. 
 
19. On July 21, 2001, officials from all countries of the Central Asian region (except Turkmenistan) 
and Russia in “Cholpon Ata”, Kyrgyzstan, negotiated the distribution of water and electricity from 
common water resources, and agreed on this. 
 
From the results of the Cholpon Ata Meeting, exploitation of the Tajik “Karakum Dam” is used to irrigate 
Uzbek and Kazakh agricultural lands (about 80 percent of the Tajik dam from the Soviet period falls to the 
two downstream countries), and in return, the reopening of the flow of water from Uzbekistan's “Fergana 
Canal” to the Tajikistan side. 
 
Kyrgyzstan, which hosted the Cholpon Ata Meeting, subordinated release water from the Toktogul Dam 
from its territory, which is needed by the agricultural sector of the downstream countries, and in particular 
Kazakhstan, to Settlement Kazakhstan's 20 million dollar debt (related to the export of Kyrgyzstan to 
Kazakhstan). 
 
20. Tajik president “Emomali Rahmon” was elected in February 2002 with the decision of the states 
of the Central Asian region to head of the IFAS. 
 
21.  On 6 October 2002, the Central Asian summit was held in Dushanbe on Aral Sea basin Issues. 
The “Dushanbe Declaration” was signed during the meeting and its 14 main pillars were approved: 
“Programs of Concrete Actions on the Problems of the Aral Sea basin for 2003–2010”. 
 
At a Dushanbe Meeting, all leaders of the Central Asian region (except Turkmenistan) agreed to form a 
“Water and Energy Consortium” to facilitate the transport of natural resources in the region. 
 
22. In 2006, the presidents of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan met in Nursultan 
(Astana), the capital of Kazakhstan, within the framework of the “Central Asian Cooperation”, to 
discuss the issue of the revival of the Aral Sea. The participants agreed that the restoration of the 
dried sea is not a regional problem and will involve Europe and many other countries. 
 
23. In 2007, an agreement between Turkmenistan and the Islamic Republic of Iran on common 
exploitation of Iran–Turkmenistan Friendship Dam water was signed in the form of the “Joint 
Commission on Cooperation” (UNECE, 2009: 6). 
 
24. In October 2008, an agreement was reached between Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan on 
the reciprocal supply of water and energy, which was later abandoned by pulling out Uzbekistan. 
 
25. Russia's former president “Dmitry Medvedev” in January 2009, in Tashkent, strongly supported 
the position of Uzbek Authorities in the water issue of the Aral basin, which has caused severe 
discontent with Tajik Authorities. But one month later (February 2009), and along with the visit 
of Kyrgyz's former president “Kurmanbek Bakiev” to Moscow, the Russian side announced the 
award of 3.1 billion euros for the construction of the “Kambarata Hydroelectric Plant” in 
Kyrgyzstan (ESISC, 2009: 4-5 ). 
 
Dual play of Russian authorities in support of Uzbekistan's position and at the same time, the financing of 
the Kambarata water project of Kyrgyzstan and the proposal to mobilize Tajikistan's “Rogun” water project, 
may create ambiguity over Moscow's real target; however, the interview of the Russia's foreign minister 
“Sergei Lavrov” in a trip to Turkmenistan could answer these ambiguities: “Success in achieving beneficial 
compromise is necessary for all parties, and in the specific context of water resources, Central Asian states 
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can count on Russia's sustained support”. The Russian authorities do not want to ignore any opportunity to 
help play a key role and lead them in the Central Asian region, and so they are taking part in water 
discussions in the region (ESISC, 2009: 4-5). 
 
26. The Almaty Seminar on April 20, 2009, in collaboration with the “United Nations Regional Centre 
for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia” (UNRCCA) and the “Economic Commission for 
Europe” (UNECE), aiming at developing methods and tools for coordinated management of water 
in region and sustainable agreements, that be beneficial for all the countries of the region in the 
field of water and energy. Of course, the results of the seminar were not at the level that was 
announced. 
 
The IFAS meeting, which was concluded on April 28, 2009 in Almaty, also had the same conditions and 
ended without significant progress (ESISC, 2009: 1 and 3). 
The efforts of Kazakh's former president Nursultan Nazarbayev as the host of the meeting to calm down 
the discussions and the appeasement of Turkmen president “Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow” did not stop 
the accusation of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan from Uzbek's former president Islam Karimov side. He alone 
criticized the plans of the two upstream countries and policies of water management limitation by these 
countries. Finally, Karimov's counterparts from Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan joined him. Islam Karimov 
was in the same position that caused more than ever, he identified himself as a regional leader opposing the 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan's hydroelectric plans (ESISC, 2009: 3-4). 
 
27. In 2017, progress was made in the region on water diplomacy, when Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan 
agreed to develop hydroelectric power plants on the “Naryn River” (a river that passing through 
Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan to Syr Darya). 
 
Shavkat Mirziyoyev, the new Uzbek president in his statement on March 9, 2018 in Dushanbe, announced 
his support for the construction of the Rogun hydroelectric dam and power plant in Tajikistan. This position 
was contrary to the position of the previous president, Islam Karimov, and is another positive sign on water 
diplomacy in the Aral Sea basin (Dalbaeva, 2018).  
 
Proposed solutions for promoting the level of water diplomacy in the Aral basin 
 
“Participation of all stakeholders in water talks”, “More active role by international organizations”, 
“Review of inappropriate water plans” and “Use of new water resources” in the Aral Sea basin, are among 
suggested solutions to promote water diplomacy in the basin, and turning water disputes into water 
cooperation through dialogue and negotiation. 
  
A. Participation of all stakeholders in Aral basin water talks 
 
The presence of Afghanistan in the meetings and talks on Amu Darya and Aral Sea is indispensable. The 
country will definitely use more and more organized water than Amu Darya water and its diversion for 
agricultural development. As a result, the countries of the Central Asian region will have to negotiate with 
Afghanistan on how to exploit common waters to prevent the deterioration of the Aral basin's water status. 
Some of the countries of the Central Asian region, especially Uzbekistan, because of their controversial 
and secessionist policies (to the extent that Islam Karimov once said that the country has solved its water 
problems for more than a thousand years on its own) and Turkmenistan, because of its insistence on its 
impartiality in international relations, are not eager to attend regional meetings. Of course, the political 
situation in Uzbekistan after the death of Islam Karimov and the coming of the new president, Shavkat 
Mirziyoyev has changed a lot. 
 
As all Central Asian countries are common in the Aral Sea basin, as a result, the actions of each regional 
actor in the exploitation of water resources in the basin can affect the entire basin area and other national 
interests. As a result, all common countries in the Aral basin should distinguish between water talks and 
water diplomacy by negotiating about military security and military alliances, and refraining from 
isolationist approaches.  
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B. More active role of international organizations in the Aral basin 
 
Some of the common countries in the Aral Sea basin do not good look at the performance of international 
organizations and institutions; for example, the two countries of Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan refused to 
attend in an international conference on the dangers of climate change and its impact on the water resources 
of the region, which was held in 2008 in Tajikistan with the participation of the “United Nations” (UN) and 
“Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe” (OSCE). 
 
Although some of the Central Asian leaders are sometimes make wrong decisions with false pessimists 
towards their neighbors or with the goal of maximizing their national interests, regardless of the state of the 
whole basin, and especially the severe conditions of the Aral Sea. But with the fact that the environmental 
impacts of the crisis, the drying of the Aral Sea, in addition to the surrounding areas of the sea and the 
Central Asian region, can also be extended to other areas (such as salt storms that can be spread hundreds 
of kilometers), it is the task of international institutions that given the transnational and even transregional 
nature of the Aral crisis, play their intrinsic duty and contribute to reducing the crisis. 
 
International organizations can technically and economically equip Aral basin Countries. International 
financial institutions such as the “International Monetary Fund” (IMF) can provide part of the cost of 
dealing with the Aral crisis by providing regional donations to the poorest countries of Tajikistan and 
Kyrgyzstan, in particular. At the same time, international organizations active in the field of agriculture and 
environment such as the “Food and Agriculture Organization” (FAO) can also be technically and 
scientifically involved in solving the Aral Crisis, and programs for water resources managing, modernizing 
agriculture and irrigation, and protecting the environment at the basin level.  
 
C. Review of inappropriate water plans for the Aral basin 
 
After 1991 and the independence of the Central Asian republics, most of these republics have put forward 
ambitious plans for water and electricity regardless of the conditions of the neighboring countries and the 
whole of the Aral Sea basin. One of the main goals of these projects is the development of agriculture and 
self-sufficiency in agricultural and food products as one of the basic needs of citizens, and as a result, 
reducing food dependency on other countries (including neighboring countries), as well as providing 
electricity through hydroelectric power plants and even exports of surplus energy are generated and 
monetized in this way. 
 
Among these projects are the plans of the Golden Age Lake of Turkmenistan, Rogun Dam of Tajikistan, 
Kambarata Dam of Kyrgyzstan, and Salma Dam of Afghanistan. Almost all of these new water projects 
that some of them have recently been exploited, have been challenged by neighboring countries that fearing 
the negative impacts of these projects on the environment and the country's water security. 
 
In this context, it is worthwhile for the countries of the region to understand the conditions of their 
neighboring countries and the environment of the region to revise their ambitious water plans. These include 
reducing the volume of dams in the study and construction (such as the Kambarata Dam of Kyrgyzstan and 
“Kabagan” and “Pashdan” dams in Afghanistan), or even stopping some projects (such as Turkmenistan's 
Golden Age Lake). All of these actions will be possible through active water diplomacy between 
neighboring countries.  
 
D. Use of new water resources in the Aral basin 
 
Due to the shortage of available water resources in the Aral Sea basin, finding new water resources outside 
the basin and transferring water from these offshore resources to the basin can be another solution to the 
water crisis and water disagreements in the Aral basin. In this regard, during the Soviet period, the project 
for the re-routing and transfer of water from some rivers in the Siberian region, such as the rivers "Ob" and 
"Irtysh" was presented to the Aral basin. Of course, these plans were aimed at developing agriculture in the 
region, which later stopped because of high costs. But in the current situation, it would be possible to 
dispense with the relatively high cost of such plans, so that the transfer of water to the Aral basin, water 
security and environment of the region would no longer be compromised. 
 
In the context of transferring water between the basins in Asia, there are large plans for the return of waters 
entering the northern seas to the central Asian regions that need these waters. Of course, the transition 
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between the basins of the North and Central Asia during the Soviet period, while also preventing droughts 
in Central Asia, could have complications; the decrease in the degree of cold and Arctic ice melting due to 
the decrease in the flow of freshwater into the seas North could be the most important transfer complication 
between water basins. As a result, the priority is to adapt the basin with the water resources in the basin 
itself and should not create new water needs beyond the capacity of water resources of the basins, such as 
agricultural development, following the transfer of water between the basins with purely economic 
objectives. 
 
But in conditions such as the current environmental conditions in the Aral basin, and because of the region's 
exposure to the Aral Sea drainage problem and saline storms, it can be transposed between the basins for 
the sole purpose of environmental (and not economic) purposes. Gave to transfer water from Siberia to the 
Aral Sea basin, it is necessary for all common countries in the basin to collaborate to pursue water 
diplomacy with the Russian Federation. In this regard, some Central Asian countries with isolated attitudes 
can join some of the Eurasian treaties and alliances, such as the “Eurasian Economic Union” (EAEU) and 
the “Collective Security Treaty Organization” (CSTO), and close proximity to Russia, without paying any 
economic rewards, the transfer of water from Siberia will save the Aral basin from acute environmental 
crises. 
 
Results and discussion  
 
According to the results of the researches, in the first half of the 21st century, the water problem is 
considered to be more important than the problem of food and energy, and most of the planet's population 
is facing a catastrophic situation in terms of water security during the same period. To cope with this 
problem can be saving water consumption, especially in agricultural and industrial sectors, reducing 
drainage to freshwater sources that destroys these resources, turning salty seawater and ocean water into 
freshwater and controlling surface water put it on the agenda. 
 
Of course, due to the fact that some of the major rivers in the world are trans-boundary and have crossed 
the political boundaries, the countries can not resolve issues related to the water crisis individually, in this 
context, there is a need for bilateral, multilateral and international cooperation. The issue of water can turn 
the current situation, which is the source of conflict, into a source of cooperation and friendship between 
neighboring countries, and it is possible that the security of the water of all countries that are common in a 
water basin supplied, and that all parties reach to their rights. 
 
In the field of water diplomacy in the Aral Sea basin, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, various regional 
institutions were established in the Central Asian region, the most important of which is the “International 
Fund to Save the Aral Sea”. The fund, which is an international body, has set itself the goal of addressing 
the problems of the Aral Sea, as well as providing services and assistance to the inhabitants of the sea's 
basin area. The Aral fund also mentions cooperation among member states to improve the environment and 
regional economy and to develop mechanisms for integrated resources management in Central Asia as part 
of its operational strategies and programs. 
 
In resolving water disputes in the Aral basin through water diplomacy, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan as two 
richer countries, it is desirable to provide Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan as the two poorer countries ahead for 
their hydroelectric capacity development. Similarly, all four countries must agree to specify the times when 
the waters are stored and released. Of course, it's hard to achieve such an agreement.  
 
Conclusion 
 
the “Economic Cooperation Organization” (ECO) can constitute one of the most important regional 
organizations that would facilitate water diplomacy between the countries of the region, and not just 
between post-Soviet countries in the Central Asian region, in the context of water disputes settlement in the 
Aral Sea basin, in the framework of common and comprehensive regional security system. 
 
Consideration 
 
All of the article content has been achieved as a result of independent research accomplished by independent 
authors mainly grounded over scientific position. In consequence, the results do not reflect any formal 
position of common countries in the Aral Sea basin.  
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